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IN SEARCH OF A GIANT LEAP: CURTAILING
INSIDER TRADING IN INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS BY THE REFORM OF
INSIDER TRADING LAWS UNDER EUROPEAN
UNION COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 89/592
Stephen J. Leacock"
I. INTRODUCTION
In a robust effort to attain more effectively the goals of the Treaty
of Rome' and more efficiently promote the free movement of capital
within a genuine common market,' the European Union (EU) has
recently taken significant steps to ensure a truly barrier-free, pan-Euro-
pean securities market. The goal of eliminating all market barriers
arose from the continuing drive toward an economically integrated
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. Barrister (Hons.) 1972, Middle
Temple, London; LL.M. 1971, London University, King's College; M.A.(Bus. Law) 1971,
City of London Polytechnic (London Guildhall University), London; Grad. Cert. Ed. (Dis-
tinction) 1971, Garnett College, London; B.A.(Bus. Law)(Hons.) 1970, City of London Poly-
technic (London Guildhall University), London. The author gratefully acknowledges the valu-
able research assistance provided by Mazyar M. Hedayat and Tim J. Ehinger in the prepara-
tion of this Article.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Treaty envisioned a single market "without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured." Id. art. 8(a). Art. 8(a) was added by art. 13 of the Single European Act of 1986. 1987
O.J. (L 169) 1, 7 [hereinafter Single European Act]. At present, fifteen nations are signatories
to the Treaty of Rome: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
See generally Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092, 1093 (1995).
2. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 67-73, 298 U.N.T.S. at 42-44.
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Europe, which gave rise to the Single European Act of 1987.1 In addi-
tion, the more persistently adverse effects of these barriers have been
exacerbated by the increasing number of international securities trans-
actions .'
Another effect of market barriers in the EU is the varying degrees
of regulatory measures that have tended to create disincentives for
investment in some member states5 while simultaneously increasing the
flow of capital into others.6 These disparities have also contributed to
varying degrees of investor confidence in the securities markets of the
individual member states and have tended to undermine integrity in the
operation of these markets.7
3. The Single European Act amended the Treaty of Rome and vested greater central
authority in the governing institutions of the EC. See Hans-Joachim Glaesner, The Single Euro-
pean Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 446, 453 (1987). The Act also set
the goal of achieving complete regulatory harmony and economic unity by December 31, 1992.
Single European Act, supra note I, art. 13; Manning G. Warren III, The Regulation of Insider
Trading in the European Community, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1037, 1037 n.2 (1991).
4. See Financial Capitals: Can the Centre Hold?, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 62. In a
cost/benefit analysis of EC regulations on insider trading, it was concluded that consumers, as
well as intermediaries, are willing to bear higher compliance costs for the sake of well-policed
financial centers. Id.
5. Italy is one of the most visible examples of a stock market dominated by insiders; thus,
it provides strong disincentives to foreign investment. See Making the Borsa Fit for Investors,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 31, 1991, at 61. See also Into a Murky Future, EUROMONEY,
July 1, 1991, at 65; Reshaping The Italian Bourse, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1991, at 85; Richard
Waddington, Reform on the Way for Scandal-Hit Italian Share Market, REUTER
NEWSWIRE-REUTER GEN. NEWS, Sept. 2, 1991; Another Big Bang-New Legislation and
Screen Trading Transforms Italy's Stockmarket, BANKING TECH., Oct. 10, 1991, at 32; Haig
Simonian, Bourse Reform-Counting The Cost Of Technological Change, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1991, at 26.
6. For example, London and Paris have two of the largest stock exchanges in Europe. See
David J. Berger, A Comparative Analysis of Takeover Regulation in the European Community,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PIoBs. 53, 62 (1992) (noting that the market capitalization of the Paris
stock market has risen from less than $120 billion in 1987 to more than $200 billion in 1990);
8.0 Equity Financing-8.1 General, FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, Aug. 1, 1993, available
in LEXIS, World Library, EIUFFO File (noting that the London Stock Exchange executed
£763 billion in transactions in 1992). The London and Paris stock exchanges were also the
first to adopt significant market regulation. Amy E. Stutz, A New Look at the European Eco-
nomic Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 155-61
(1990).
7. "Adoption of the Insider Trading Directive [89/592 adopted on November 13, 1989]
indicates the Community's awareness that confidence in the integrity of the market is essential
to the development of a major securities market." Laraine L. Laudati, Report of the Delegation
to the European Community: Key Issues in the 1992 Unification Program, I flex Briefing
Monograph Series 12 (1990); see also Warren, supra note 3, at 1039. The EC's efforts to
harmonize securities regulations are intended "to level the playing field for market participants
and to promote investor confidence" in the securities markets of the member states. Id. Efforts
to outlaw insider trading throughout the EC, just as in the United States, are based upon the
[Vol. 3:51
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As of September 30, 1990, France, the United Kingdom, Germa-
ny, the Netherlands, and Denmark had all introduced a number of
measures against insider trading,' varying in stringency. Ireland and
Italy were in the process of introducing such legislation. 9 Stock mar-
kets in the other EU countries had been either dominated by policies
that promoted a no-questions-asked posture," or had been less affect-
ed by the ravages of insider trading." These countries, therefore,
lacked the necessary justification for the relatively heavy expenditure
required to properly administer a full set of sophisticated, regulatory
insider-trading laws.
More recently, however, the ever-increasing flow of capital across
national boundaries, which picked up speed in the 1980s,' 2 exposed
both larger and smaller exchanges - in EU, as well as in non-EU
countries - to the vagaries of insider-trading tactics. Switzerland, long
a destination for off-shore capital, serves as an example. 3
realization that a "widespread fear of pervasive unfairness" among investors has a "corrosive
impact" on securities markets. ABA Comm'n on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of the Task
Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 225 (1985). See also Thomas Lee
Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons from the European Community Directive, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 236-37 (1992) (characterizing the directive as largely success-
ful in defining insider trading, in contrast to the reluctance of United States regulatory authori-
ties to make the effort to arrive at a similarly effective definition).
8. "Insider trading," as the term is used in this paper, involves the misuse of material in-
formation not available to the public in order to make profits or avoid losses in the purchase
and sale of securities. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 42 (6th ed. 1987).
9. The Coordination of Regulations on Insider Trading, FIN. SERVICES, Sept. 30, 1990,
available in WESTLAW, European Update, 1990 WL 262262.
10. Greece, Italy, and Portugal, for example, had previously considered insider trading to
be acceptable. Douglas A. Nystrom, Note, Securities-Insider Trading-The Effects of the New
EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 GA. J. IN'L & COMP. L. 119, 119 n.3 (1988) (citing
BARRY ALEXANDER K. RIDER AND H. LEIGH FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRAD-
ING 251-53, 263 (1979)).
11. See generally Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends
in the International Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROS. 199, 199-203
(1992) (noting that countries with developing stock markets were beginning to recognize the
significance of regulation).
12. See Christine A. McGuinness, Note, Toward the Unification of European Capital
Markets: The EEC's Proposed Directive on Insider Trading, II FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 432,
434-35 (1988) (describing the globalization of securities trading).
13. In 1988, Switzerland (a non-EU country) acquiesced to demands, primarily by the
United States, to increase market transparency in order to counter the growing number of
insider-trading scandals resulting from the vaunted practice of Swiss banking secrecy. Part of
the result was Switzerland's first insider-trading law. See Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch,
Code penal suisse, Codice penale svizzero art. 161, 1, 3 (Switz.). See also A Clockwork
Future for Finanzplatz Schweiz?, ECONOMIST, July 7, 1990, at 73 [hereinafter Clockwork
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
It is estimated that seventy percent of the funds under Swiss man-
agement are foreign owned, and that thirty to forty percent of the share
capital of Swiss companies quoted on the stock market is held by over-
seas investors. 4 In light of the gentlemen's secrecy agreement among
Swiss bankers, many observers have alleged that a culture of insider
trading has been imported into Switzerland, with no history of disclo-
sure or enforcement to counter its effects. 5 Moreover, those securities
markets in which effective restrictions on insider trading were absent
became significantly less competitive in the tightening race for foreign,
as well as domestic, capital.' 6 Investors are wary of receiving reduced
profits or being saddled with losses caused by trading with insiders in
possession of valuable nonpublic information about the securities being
traded. Thus, they have preferred to channel their funds into those few
markets that protect them from insider trading."
As a consequence, Germany, for example, has finally recognized
the need for some form of insider-trading legislation in order to build a
competitive international financial sector, despite its formerly vigorous
opposition to EU proposals for banning insider trading by legal
means." This recognition followed a relatively sharp decline in the
German capital markets index. This accompanied a correspondingly
significant decline in foreign investor confidence in the German market
due to the highly publicized insider-trading scandal involving
Germany's largest banking interest, Deutsche Bank."' Foreign percep-
tions of the German economy had become the "pivotal factor in the
movement of share prices," and apprehension over insider trading and
interest rates had lowered the stock market index.2"
With respect to domestic investors in Germany, the ease with
which securities could now be traded internationally made the transfer
of capital to more highly regulated foreign markets more attractive and
seductive. 2' Thus, the ability of domestic corporations to efficiently
Future].
14. See Clockwork Future, supra note 13, at 73.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. See Finance Ministry Releases Plan to Revamp Securities Laws; Exchanges Reach
Agreement, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Jan. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ISRR
File [hereinafter Finance Ministry].
19. Stock and Bond Financing, INVESTING LICENSING & TRADING, Sept. 1, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, EIUILT File.
20. Id. See Pitt & Hardison, supra note 11, at 202.
21. See Joseph Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-
Restraint?, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 507, 509-10 (1986) (stating that small investors in Ger-
many "shy away" from domestic stock investments because of the widely held belief that the
markets are "fixed" in favor of insiders).
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raise equity capital was adversely affected, necessitating heavy reliance
on banks or debt financing.22
Against this backdrop, EU Council Directive 89/592,23 adopted in
November, 1989, mandated member states to enact insider-trading
legislation that met or exceeded certain identified minimum specifica-
tions, before June 1, 1992.24 In anticipation of this Directive, some
member states embarked upon drafting laws impacting insider trading
as early as 1986.25
The language and requirements of EU Council Directive 89/592
have even led a number of nonmember countries to adopt similar mea-
sures or to increase the strictness of existing insider-trading enact-
ments.26 This is particularly true of the members of the European
22. See id. at 530 (describing the heavy debt financing among German corporations). See
also NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S "BIG BANG"
AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 395 (1991) (noting the dependence of German
companies on bank credit).
23. Council Directive 89/592 on Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J.
(L 334) 30 [hereinafter Directive 89/592]. Directive 89/592 was first proposed, in a different
form, in 1987, although the European Commission (Commission) had been examining alterna-
tives for dealing with insider trading since 1976. These earlier studies produced the "Commis-
sion Recommendation Concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in
Transferable Securities," which received only a lukewarm reception. Warren, supra note 3, at
1043-45.
24. Under the Treaty of Rome, directives are essentially orders to the member states,
issued by the Council and the Commission, to enact a certain kind of legislation. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 1, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. at 78. Except for regulations issued by the Coun-
cil or the Commission, EC institutions do not generally have the authority to enact law for the
Community as a whole. Instead, the Council and the Commission are vested with the power to
demand that member states enact laws that further the goals of the Treaty of Rome. Id. See D.
LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 126-48 (5th
ed. 1991) (examining the interaction of the Treaty of Rome articles with specific authority such
as article 100 and article 235 with the general power granted in article 189 in regard to the
ability of the Council or Commissioner to legislate); see also Christopher Cruickshank, Insider
Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L BUS. LAW. 345, 345 (1982) (explaining the drafting procedure
for a Directive). Much of the Commission's power to shape the law of the EC is exercised
through the initiation of legislative measures for adoption by the Council and the taking of
legal measures under authority from the Council. ERIC STEIN ET AL., DOCUMENTS FOR EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 40 (1976).
25. See Stutz, supra note 6, at 164-65 (noting that Belgium and Denmark had insider
trading laws pre-dating Directive 891592). These states, however, did not know the specifics
that the upcoming directive would adopt and, therefore, had to reexamine the express language
of their own statutes in order to ensure that the provisions thereof conform to the directive's
mandate. See EC: Insider Dealing; EC Member States Prepare Rules for 1992, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1990, at 8.
26. See, e.g., Austria-Overseas Business Report, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK MARKET
REP., Sept. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (noting that Austria
passed new legislation covering several areas of securities law, including insider trading, in
order to harmonize Austrian law with EC law); Swiss Insider Trading Bill Passes Final Parlia-
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Free Trade Association (EFTA).27 Indisputably, the influence of the
United States' experience of highly regulated securities markets under
the supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)28
has contributed to the sense of immediacy fueling adoption of insider-
trading regulations among both EU and EFTA nations.29
II. ESSENTIALS OF EU COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 89/592
A. Basics
The Single European Act of 1987 strived to sustain momentum
toward complete European economic integration by designating Decem-
ber 31, 1992, as the deadline for establishing common, barrier-free
markets in goods, employment, services, and capital.3" Substantial
progress had already been made in the first three categories, through
decades of directives and court decisions.3 Now, establishing a com-
mon market for capital presented the greatest challenge to the twelve
member states. 2 The unenviable task confronting the member states,
mentary Hurdle, REUTER LIAR. REP., Dec. 16, 1987, available in LEXIS, World Library,
REUWLD File (examining Switzerland's new insider-trading law).
27. Three members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (viz. Iceland, Liech-
tenstein and Norway) have become parties to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement.
See Goebel, supra note 1, at 1103-08. Switzerland, the fourth member of EFTA, did not be-
come a member of the EEA because of a Swiss referendum in 1992 against membership. Id. at
1105. For a brief historical discussion of EFTA see Friedl Weiss, The European Free Trade
Association after Twenty-five Years, 5 Y.B. EUR. LAW 287 (1985).
28. The SEC was instituted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1982).
29. Various joint statements and memoranda of understanding (MOU) have been signed
between the SEC and European nations. Cooperating states include the United Kingdom,
France, and The Netherlands. See SEC, EC Sign Joint Statement Regarding Exchange of Infor-
mation, INT'L FIN. DAILY, Sept. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, BNAIBF File.
30. Single European Act, supra note 1, art. 13.
31. See, e.g., Case 249181, Commission v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005, 2 C.M.L.R. 104
(1983) (broadly defining the ban on quantitative restrictions on goods so as to find that a "Buy
Irish" campaign sponsored by the government impeded the free movement of goods); Case
53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. 1035, 2 C.M.L.R. 454 (1982)
(broadly defining the term "worker" so as to extend the freedom of movement to persons
seeking part-time work); Case 115/78, Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
1979 E.C.R. 399, 2 C.M.L.R. 357 (1979) (recognizing the right of family members to ac-
company a national who exercises the freedom of establishment); Council Directive 64/221,
1968 O.J. (L 257) 13 (harmonizing the laws of the various countries invoking exceptions to the
free movement of workers); Council Directive 77/249, 1977 O.J. (L 78) 17 (establishing rules
more liberal than those in the United States for the licensing of lawyers in the various jurisdic-
tions of the EC).
32. WILLIAM RAWLISON & MALACHY CORNWELL-KELLY, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW §
12.20 (1990). See also Presentation of Interim Report on Completion of Internal Market,
AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File (noting
that Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg have produced the most vigorous resistance to reforms
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therefore, was to craft a reasonable and logical investor protection
system for the EU that would endure into the twenty-first century and
beyond.
Council Directive 89/592, the result of this formidable task, repre-
sented an ambitious step toward economic integration in EU securities
markets. Of the twelve member states, only the United Kingdom33 and
France' had any history of meaningful governmental intervention and
regulation of their securities markets in general, or insider trading in
particular.35 This Directive, requiring all twelve member states to
adopt or improve insider-trading legislation before December 31, 1992,
constituted more than merely the harmonization of their existing laws.
With respect to eight member states, the Directive required, for the
first time, the adoption of substantive restrictions on securities ex-
changes, in addition to the creation of genuinely viable administrative
institutions to effectively enforce those restrictions.36 Regarding the
United Kingdom and France, the fundamental effect of Directive
89/592 was to modify even their comparatively strict insider-trading
laws.37
The Directive's philosophy more closely resembled that of the
United States' federal regulatory scheme rather than any European
designed to create a common European market).
33. See Maxwell Pension Fund Scandal Leads to U.K. Review of Financial Regulation,
INT'L FIN. DAILY, Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. The
United Kingdom's current two-tiered system of securities regulation was created by the Finan-
cial Services Act of 1986, ch. 60. Under this self-regulatory structure, the Treasury and Secu-
rities and Investment Board (SIB) jointly oversee four industry funded Self-Regulatory Organi-
zations (SRO's); the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA); the Financial Intermediaries
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA); the Life Assurance and Unit Trust
Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO); and the Investment Management Regulatory Organization
(IMRO). Id. Despite a study commissioned in 1992 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nor-
man Lamont, to examine the system's apparent failure in light of the Robert Maxwell affair
and other insider-trading scandals, Mr. Andrew Large, Chairman of the SIB, has rejected the
notion of developing a British regulatory body resembling the American SEC. Id. See also
London's Regulatory Mess, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1993, at 15.
34. See George Graham, European Finance and Investment-The New Powers of the COB,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at VIII; William Dawkins, France Defines Insider Trading, FIN.
TIMES, May 8, 1990, at 26. Despite a history of intervention in the financial markets, the chief
regulatory authority in France, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), was forced
by insider-trading scandals such as those involving Societ6 Ggnerale, Pechiney-Triangle, and
Perrirr, to promulgate a comprehensive code of conduct in 1990, including the introduction of
insider trading into French law. The measure articulates a definition of insider trading that is
essentially identical to that in Council Directive 89/592. Id.
35. See supra notes 33-34.
36. Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain
did not have substantive insider-trading regulation. See Stutz, supra note 6, at 154-67.
37. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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model. Similar to the United States' federal securities law approach,
the philosophy behind the Directive's blueprint for securities regulation
was the adoption of public disclosure of market-sensitive informa-
tion. 8 For example, in the United Kingdom, insider trading had tradi-
tionally been perceived as falling primarily under the bailiwick of
"6pure company law."39 Thus, the crime of insider trading was defined
in terms of the fiduciary duties owed by the officers and directors (i.e.,
the insiders) of a corporation." So that the company, rather than the
shareholders, was perceived as the person victimized by insider trad-
ing. 4
The Directive essentially changed the legal conceptualization of
insider-trading regulation. It shifted the focus from the bilateral (com-
pany versus insiders) approach of "pure company law" to the more
dynamic multilateral approach of securities-market regulation. 2 Fur-
thermore, in light of the definitions of "inside information,"43 "insid-
38. "IDjisclosure still remains the principal safeguard on which the [United Kingdom]
Companies Acts pin their faith, and every succeeding Act since 1862 has added to the extent of
the publicity required ...." L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 497
(4th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). United Kingdom adoption of the disclosure philosophy pre-
dates the United States's adoption of this safeguard in the federal securities regulation statutory
scheme. However, creation of a single regulatory body (i.e. the SEC) was an American inno-
vation. See also JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 8, at 37. See Stutz, supra note 6, at 139. See
Warren, supra note 3, at 1052 (stating that the Council adopted a philosophy of disclosure in
enacting the directive); Lisa A. Hedges, Note, Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of
the Insider Trading Laws of the Member States, VIII B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 151, 155
(1985). See also P.L. Davies, The European Community's Directive on Insider Dealing: From
Company Law to Securities Market Regulation?, I I OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 92, 94-101
(1991) (describing the philosophical bases for Directive 89/592). The EC's emphasis on disclo-
sure is reflected in several of the ten directives comprising the Community's program on com-
pany law harmonization. See Hedges, supra, at 166.
39. GOWER, supra note 38, at 631. See also Davies, supra note 38, at 92-93.
40. See Davies, supra note 38, at 95.
41. The courts attempted to ameliorate this unjust construct and allow shareholder recovery
in some instances. See GOWER, supra note 38, at 573, 631. See also Davies, supra note 38, at
93-95.
42. This shift is reflected in the legal basis for the Directive. The initial proposal for Di-
rective 89/592 invoked Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome as the basis for the Directive.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 54, 298 U.N.T.S. at 38-39. Article 54 focuses on the
standards of fair behavior toward investors and creditors of member states' firms who do busi-
ness with firms and brokerages in other member states. Id. However, upon the recommenda-
tion of the European Parliament, the Council used Article 100a of the Single European Act as
the legal basis for the Directive. See Single European Act, supra note 1. Article 100a is aimed
at ensuring the smooth functioning of the European economy as a unified market. Id. See also
Warren, supra note 3, at 1048.
43. The Directive defines "inside information" as information that: (i) relates to one or
several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities; (ii) is of a
precise nature; (iii) has not been made public; and (iv) if made public, would be likely to have
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er,"" and other critical elements of insider-trading violations, the
Directive has opted for an extended sphere of coverage. 5 The Direc-
tive, therefore, regulates the activities of a cadre of personnel, encom-
passing more than just a few persons closely associated with a compa-
ny.46 Arguably, the scope of the Directive extends to "tippees," as
these persons are known in United States securities markets." Unfor-
tunately, however, the Directive does not expressly prohibit tippees
from simply passing the inside information on to subsequent tippees. s
Additionally, Directive 89/592 mandates that all member states
regulate insiders, as defined in the Directive,4 9 and punish them for
violations that they commit within the territorial boundaries of the
member states." This includes securities transactions effectuated out-
side those boundaries that have been carried out on securities markets
within the territory of any member state."' Administratively, there-
fore, the most onerous aspect of the Directive is not so much the man-
a significant effect on the price of the security or securities in question. Directive 89/592, su-
pra note 23, art. 1(1). The class of "transferable securities," to which the Directive's re-
strictions on insider trading apply, includes shares and debt securities and their equivalents, in
addition to, contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire, or dispose of such securities, futures
contracts, options, financial futures, and index contracts in respect of such securities. Id. art.
1(2).
44. "Insider" is defined as someone who: (A) takes advantage of inside information; (i)
with full knowledge of the facts; (ii) by acquiring or disposing, directly or indirectly, transfer-
able securities of the issuing company to which the information relates; (iii) for his own ac-
count or for the account of a third party; and (B) possesses such inside information because of
his (i) membership in administrative, management, or supervisory bodies of the issuing compa-
ny; (ii) holding in the capital of the issuing company; or (iii) access to such inside information
in the exercise of his employment, profession, or duties. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art.
2(1). Additionally, where the insider is a legal person, responsibility for insider trading atta-
ches to anyone who takes part in the decision to carry out the illegal transaction. See id. art.
2(2).
45. Primary insiders are prohibited from disclosing information or making recommenda-
tions. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 3. Secondary insiders who have full knowledge of
inside information, which could only have come from a primary insider, are also subject to
regulation. Id. art. 4.
46. See Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 3. Thus, persons who are not explicitly
within the definition of "insider," but who nevertheless possess inside information that only an
insider could have provided, are also subject to restrictions on trading. See id. art. 4.
47. See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (defining "tippees"
as "persons given information by insiders in breach of trust").
48. See definition of "secondary insiders." Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 4. There-
fore, a secondary insider (under the Directive's definition) would be the equivalent of a tippee
(under the U.S. federal securities law definition), but would not be a subsequent tippee (under
the U.S. federal securities law definition).
49. See Directive 89/592, supra note 23, arts. 2-4.
50. See Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 5.
51. Id.
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date to enact the insider-trading legislation, but rather establishing the
fundamental structure to enforce the Directive's mandate.52 The desig-
nation of pertinent authorities and the formation of administrative
organizations to ensure enforcement of the regulations will prove costly
to the individual member states. 3 Furthermore, the Directive requires
member states to imbue such authorities with all supervisory and inves-
tigatory powers necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out their
statutory functions.'
B. Penalties
With respect to the imposition of penalties for insider-trading
violations, the Directive leaves specific choices to the member states
individually.55 Penalties need not be criminal. 6 In fact, they may
take any form, provided that they are sufficiently coercive to deter
conduct violative of the insider-trading enactments. In light of past
unsuccessful enforcement of regulations by some member states, this
grant of discretion by the Directive does not ensure the curbing of
insider trading."
III. THE GERMAN RESPONSE
Traditionally, Germany has been reluctant to play a leadership role
in the EU.59 The country's unwillingness to assume command is typ-
52. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 8.
53. Recently, for example,- Italy has taken steps to regularize disclosure, inhibit insider
trading, and inject greater competition into the stock market by introducing a new form of
business organization, the Societa di Intermediazione Mobiliare (SIM), to compete with brokers
formerly enjoying a monopoly. Into a Murky Future, supra note 5, at 65; Another Big
Bang-New Legislation and Screen Trading Transforms Italy's Stockmarket, supra note 5, at
32. These steps, intended to bring the Italian market into line with EC requirements, were
taken concurrently with the allocation of expanded powers and additional staff to Consob, the
Italian stock market watchdog. Id.
54. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 8. Progress in empowering the authorities has
been inconsistent as EC member states proceed to harmonize the requirements of Directive
89/592 with their respective domestic financial cultures. See Clockwork Future, supra note 13,
at 73; Alex Brummer, Sweeping Away an Insidious Culture of Self-Regulation, GUARDIAN,
May 8, 1993, at 36.
55. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 13.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The history of prior enforcement by EC member states has been inconsistent. For
example, there has been a relative lack of enforcement in Italy; marginal enforcement in Ger-
many, where compliance with insider-trading laws has heretofore been voluntary and any
"penalties" previously imposed for insider infractions have been civil restitution; and the most
significant enforcement in the United Kingdom and France, where a mixture of civil and crimi-
nal penalties have traditionally been available to regulators. See Stutz, supra note 6, at 155-67.
59. German President Richard von Weizsacker Addresses Members, COUNCIL CHRON.
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ified by the following remarks of President Richard von Weizsacker:
Germany is not the leading power in the European Community. It is not the
senior partner and is not first among equals either. Germany would not want
such a position, could not hold such a position and, what is more, should not
be pushed into such a position either from within or without.'
Of course, these views may be perceived in the political context of the
EU, but they unavoidably resonate in the legal context as well. As
President von Weizsacker readily conceded: "It is true, [that] Germa-
ny-together with France-not only constitutes the center of Europe, [but]
Germany also serves on that continent as an engine for European unifi-
cation. "6 It is therefore the obligation of "the engine" to push, or
pull, the EU into the sophisticated securities-market regulatory era of
the twenty-first century, in general; and to be at the forefront of mod-
em investor-protective insider-trading measures within the EU in par-
ticular.
Germany presented a special problem in the implementation of the
insider trading Directive. Unlike the other two economic and financial
heavyweights in the EU, the United Kingdom and France, Germany
had not previously established a set of mandatory procedures for regu-
lating insider trading.62 Thus, implementing the Directive in Germany
required more than merely fine-tuning or amending existing legislation.
Rather, the creation of an entirely new regulatory system for insider
trading was necessary. This provided a challenge for German legisla-
tors.
First, the banking industry had strongly opposed legal measures
against insider trading.63 Second, and more important, the German
government, at first, vigorously opposed the substantive thrust of Di-
rective 89/592 during its formative stages, which emphasized legally
binding regulations.' Instead, Germany preferred self-regulatory mea-
sures, relying on voluntary guidelines on insider trading drafted in
1970, and amended in 1976, and again in 1988, by the German Stock
Exchange Commission of Experts.' The rationale for creating these
(Chicago), Sept. 1993, at I [hereinafter German President].
60. Id. at 1, 3.
61. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
62. Stutz, supra note 6, at 161; Blum, supra note 21, at 516-17.
63. Blum, supra note 21, at 528.
64. Warren, supra note 3, at 1045.
65. Insider Trading: Insider Trade Directives as of July 1976, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE 85, app. 4 at 108-10 (J. Michael Robinson ed. & Gerhard
Wegen trans., 1985) [hereinafter INSIDER TRADING GUIDELINES]. See also Pitt & Hardison,
supra note il, at 216 (noting that the Guidelines, as adopted in 1970, and amended in 1976
and 1988, indicate a gradual shift in the German position towards greater harmony with Di-
rective 89/592).
66. Marjory A. Appel & Gerhard Wegen, The EEC Directive on Insider Trading, 22 REV.
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voluntary guidelines was the contention that to be caught engaging in
insider trading, and subsequently shunned by the business community
at large, would be sufficient punishment to deter insider trading.67
The financial and economic weight of opinions expressed by Ger-
man financial institutions was another obstacle to enacting the Directive
into law in Germany. These institutions consistently resisted govern-
mental intervention to solve the problem, vehemently supporting self-
regulation as the most viable alternative.6" For Germany, Directive
89/592 meant considerably more than simply establishing a novel regu-
latory system where none previously existed. Rather, the Directive
required the radical transformation of deeply entrenched attitudes
strongly favoring a privately regulated system.
Replacing this system with intrusive governmental intervention has
been a formidable step. This has been particularly true since the atti-
tude of the German government toward implementing the Directive
significantly reflected the attitudes of the country's major financial
institutions.69 As a result, although the Directive was adopted in 1989,
the German government did not initiate any viable plans for enactment
of conforming insider-trading laws until 1992.70 It did not actually
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 137, 140 (1989) (stating that the Stock Exchange Commission of
Experts was primarily responsible for drafting the guidelines); Insider Trading in West Germa-
ny: Impeccable Complacency, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989, at 83 (stating that the guidelines
were drafted and amended in 1970, 1976, and 1988).
67. German Insider Trading: Behind the Times, Economist, July 13, 1991, at 86. The rules
of procedure for investigating an insider-trading violation provide that the investigatory board
may not publish its findings unless the violation is extreme or the violator consents. Blum,
supra note 21, at 521. Furthermore, insider-trading regulations are currently voluntary and
only those who agree to be bound may be punished for their violation. Insider Commission
Powerless in Steinkuehler Case, REUTER FIN. REP., May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, FINRPT File. The likely deterrent effect of such feeble "enforcement" provisions
remains indeterminate at best, and nugatory at worst, although public humiliation in the wake
of recent insider-trading scandals has precipitated relatively harsh social sanctions such as the
loss of position, power, and livelihood. Germany: Daimler Shareholders Snub Disgraced Union
Chief, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, BUSRPT
File; Germany: Deutsche Bank Will Not Bless Steinkuehler's Work, REUTER FIN. REP., May
26, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, FINRPT File.
68. Stutz, supra note 6, at 163.
69. See supra note 63.
70. Finance Ministry, supra note 18. See also Tighter Insider Trading Rules Have Little
Practical Impact, FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, Mar. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, FINFOR File (noting that the Finance Ministry had, at that time, "not even
begun to grapple with the issue"); O.W. Breydha, German Equity Markets, in GLOBAL EQUITY
MARKETS 117, 133 (Jess Lederman & Keith Park eds., 1991) (predicting that Germany would
not succeed in meeting the deadline for implementing the directive on insider trading). Un-
doubtedly, the issuance by the Commission of an Art. 169 letter (under Treaty of Rome, supra
note 1, art. 169, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75) to Germany in 1992, must have prodded enactment of
conforming legislation. See Tenth Annual Report on the Monitoring of the Application of
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enact the Directive into law in Germany until 1994.11
Essentially, Directive 89/592 mandated that Germany, arguably the
most economically powerful member state,72 eschew a firmly held
belief system with respect to its securities markets and fundamentally
amend its investor protection laws. The issuance of the Directive re-
flected the shift in jurisdictional forces within the EU, which ushered
in a new era of enhanced juridical authority of the Council, authorizing
it to act by qualified majority under a "co-operation procedure' 73 in-
volving the European Parliament.74 The new arrangement enabled the
Council to exercise unprecedented powers to order fundamental reform
of the securities markets of the member states.75 This historical shift
in the correlation of intrinsic legal forces in the EU is the legacy of the
Single European Act, which replaced the rigid requirement of unanimi-
ty in the Council decision-making process, when amending a Commis-
sion proposal,76 with the greater flexibility of qualified majority
rule.77
Although Germany had argued forcefully against the adoption of
these fundamental changes in insider-trading laws, it was forced to
succumb to the will of the other member states. These States ranged
from the United Kingdom, where insider trading was already quite
tightly regulated,7" to Spain,79 which had "reportedly rampant" insid-
Community Law: Report on the Application of Directives, COM(93)320 final at 356. "At the
beginning of 1993 the Federal Government [of Germany] decided to implement the EC Direc-
tives on insider dealing and takeovers by means of a new Securities Trading Act." Bruckhaus
W. Stegemann, Regional Development: Germany, 28 INT'L LAW. 155, 161 (1994) (footnote
omitted).
71. Gesetz uber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und
wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz), 1994 BGBI. 1 1749
[hereinafter German Statute].
72. See supra text accompanying note 61.
73. See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 24, at 230.
74. See Single European Act of 1986, supra note 1, art. 7, which amends Article 149 of
the Treaty of Rome (replacing the universal requirement of unanimity with respect to an EC
Council vote to amend an EC Commission proposal).
75. See Directive 89/592, supra note 23, Preamble.
76. See RAWLISON & CORNWELL-KELLY, supra note 32, § 12.20.
77. "Qualified majority rule" is explained in Article 148 of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 1, art. 148, 298 U.N.T.S. at 70. Article 148 weighs the voting power of the
member states differently, creating a total of seventy-six possible votes among the twelve mem-
ber states. Id. To adopt a proposal from the Commission (e.g., a proposed directive), fifty-four
votes are required; in all other cases, fifty-four votes from eight member states are required.
Id.
78. See supra text accompanying note 33.
79. See Insider Trading in Europe: A Daft Draft, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1989, at 86 [here-
inafter Daft Draft] (noting that Spain was quite willing to adopt the proposed insider trading
directive by June 1989).
1995]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
er trading."°
Furthermore, in light of Germany's lack of hostility in the past
toward even egregious insider-trading practices, it is not surprising that
subsequent to the issuance of Directive 89/592, the integrity of the
German securities market was further called into question. In the recent
past, the number of insider trading scandals in Germany increased,
providing ammunition for those who favored reform of its investor pro-
tection laws regulating insider trading.8 First, a scandal arose in late
June, 1991, involving Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest banking insti-
tution. This prompted Germany's then Finance Minister, Theo Waigel,
to introduce a comprehensive plan for restructuring German securities
markets, including a call for insider-trading legislation consistent with
Directive 89/592.82 More recently, a major scandal involving Mr.
Steinkuehler, a supervisory board member of Daimler Benz,83 further
raised national awareness of insider-trading abuses. As a result of this
consciousness-raising, governmental officials and securities traders,
sensitive to Germany's role in the EU, evinced the willingness to sup-
port federal securities law reform that ultimately led to enactment of
the German legislation.84
80. Financing, Bus. INT'L FORECASTING, June 13, 1989, available in LEXIS, World
Library, EIUCF File. In fact, financially less-developed member states, such as Spain, may
have supported the Directive because they reasoned that these reforms would substantially
improve foreign investors' confidence in the integrity of their own securities markets.
81. See British Bankers Association, THOMSON'S FIN. COMPLIANCE WATCH81., Oct. 11,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ARCNWS File. See also Michael Shields, Insider
Trading Becoming Less Acceptable in Europe, REUTER LiBR. REP., Dec. 2, 1989, available in
LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD File.
82. See Finance Ministry, supra note 18.
83. The most notable recent insider-trading scandal in Germany, and the one that chal-
lenged the German system on the most fundamental level, is the case of Franz Steinkuehler,
leader of Germany's most powerful union, IG Metall, and until recently, a board member of
Daimler Benz. Mr. Steinkuehler's alleged purchase of shares of Mercedes Automobile Holding
(M.A.H.) and Dutch aerospace company Fokker, in advance of share swaps by Daimler, se-
verely undermined the credibility of the hallowed German practice of Mitbestimmung, which
imposes worker directors on every enterprise. The scandal simultaneously exposed (a) the
shortcomings of the practice of Mitbestimmung, (b) the inadequacies of the German system of
voluntary restraint in matters of insider dealing, and most importantly, (c) the distinct lack of
power of the German regulatory authorities. See European Business-Union Man's Daimler
Dealing Downfall Fuels German Woes, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 31, 1993, at 22; Insider Com-
mission Powerless in Steinkuehler Case, REUTER NEWSWIRE-ECON. NEWS, May 28, 1993;
Steinkuehler Offers to Resign Over Insider Issue, REUTER NEWSWIRE-ECON. NEWS, May 24,
1993; Germany: Capitalism's Limits, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1993, at 58; Insider Dealing: Bal-
ancing Act, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 84; and finally, "Franz Steinkuhler, chief of IG
Metall, [Germany's] biggest union ... [o]n May 25[, 1993,] . . . resigned after admitting that
he had speculated in the shares of companies associated with Daimler-Benz while sitting on its
supervisory board." Germany: Capitalism's Limits, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1993, at 58.
84. See German Statute, supra note 71.
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IV. THE GERMAN STATUTE CONTRASTED WITH GERMANY'S
VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON INSIDER TRADING
A. The Guidelines
The voluntary guidelines on insider trading in Germany were in
desperate need of reform. Adoption by German corporations of the
voluntary guidelines, unfortunately, left a serious gap in the protective
net for securities investors. Therefore, sweeping changes were there-
fore necessary in order to ensure conformance with requirements of the
Directive. Even though the definition of "insider" in the guidelines was
expanded (as part of the 1988 amendments) to include advisors and
lenders privy to inside information," it was still more narrowly drawn
than the definition in the Directive.86 It included only persons in spe-
cifically listed positions, which typically encompassed those persons
who had a very close relationship with the company, enabling them to
obtain inside information in the ordinary course of their business activi-
ties.87 The guideline definition unfortunately omitted "tippees" alto-
gether.88
Furthermore, the scope of "inside information" regulated by the
guidelines was particularly constrained. Although "inside information"
included "knowledge of circumstances not yet disclosed or publicly
known that could affect the valuation of insider securities," 9 in reali-
ty, this apparently broad definition was interpreted restrictively.'
Moreover, any restrictions imposed upon insiders did not apply to
transactions in securities not listed on a German stock exchange,
thereby leaving unregulated a significant subseries of securities transac-
tions that could be conducted through private intermediaries.9 Nor
85. See West Germany Broadens Rules on Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1988, at
A28. See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
86. West Germany Broadens Rules on Insider Trading, supra note 85, at A28.
87. The definition of "insider" in §2 of the Insider Trading Guidelines listed legal repre-
sentatives and members of the supervisory board of a company or an affiliated domestic enter-
prise; shareholders holding less than twenty-five percent of the company shares and their legal
representatives; members of the board of directors holding less than twenty-five percent of the
company shares; employees obtaining inside information in the ordinary course of their busi-
ness; agents of the company obtaining inside information in the ordinary course of their busi-
ness with the company; banks and members of their supervisory boards; and other general
managers, employees, and agents retained by the corporation and privy to inside information in
the ordinary course of their business. See Appel & Wegen, supra note 66, at 141 n.37. See
also Thomas J. Ramsdell, The EEC Directive on Insider Trading: Will There Be a Cure by
1992?, 6 AMER. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 637, 669-71 (1991) (discussing the limited definition
of insider in the German guidelines compared to the EC Directive).
88. Appel & Wegen, supra note 66, at 141.
89. Id. (citing INSIDER TRADING GUIDELINES, supra note 65, § 2(3), at 109).
90. INSIDER TRADING GUIDELINES, supra note 65, § 2, at 108-09.
91. Appel & Wegen, supra note 66, at 141; Stutz, supra note 6, at 163; IOC INTERNA-
1995]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
did the restrictions apply to "secondary insiders," such as tippees. 92
Finally, enforcement mechanisms were ineffective. Very few
formal investigations resulted from adoption of the voluntary guide-
lines,93 and the most recent finding of guilt under the guidelines oc-
curred in 1986, when Daimler-Benz AG made a tender offer for the
shares of Allgemeine Elektriziteits Gezellschaft (AEG).94 Even then,
the wrongdoer, a board member of AEG, was required only to return
to AEG DM 16,000, the ill-gotten gains reaped from the use of inside
information.95 The violating board member was not disciplined, how-
ever, since the insider-trading rules had required voluntary consent by
the insider in order to become binding.96
Only private review boards of the various stock exchanges were
empowered to initiate investigations into suspicious trading activi-
ties.97 Furthermore, this authority only arose upon the filing of an
essentially private complaint that alleged a violation of the guide-
lines.9" No central enforcement agency existed in Germany. In fact,
the German securities market-place is still quite fragmented," being
spread among a number of stock exchanges with the Frankfurt bourse
generating the most business.)°  This configuration, a result of
Germany's pattern of fragmentation and local autonomy,'' has tend-
TIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 8C. 11 [2] (Harold S. Bloomenthal
& Samuel Wolff eds., 1995).
92. Appel & Wegen, supra note 66, at 141.
93. The Finanzplatz Fairytale - How Insider-trading Scandals Finally Awaken the Banks,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 31, 1992, available in Lexis, World Library, CURNWS File.
94. Blum, supra note 21, 526-28.
95. Sweeping out the Stables, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 1991, at 15. Restitution was then the
standard remedy for insider-trading violations in Germany. Id. See Nystrom, supra note 10, at
129.
96. Stutz, supra note 6, at 163 (citing Elsing & Shook-Wiercinok, New German Insider
Trading Regulations, 1988 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 30, 31 (1988)).
The Frankfurt bourse's insider commission said it would not be able to take action
against former German union leader Franz Steinkuehler even if it could be proved
that he used insider information in share deals. The commission's chairman
Friedrich-Carl zur Megede [indicated that] the insider commission could only take
action against people who had signed insider guidelines at a firm where they had
access to privileged information .... Steinkuehler - unlike other members of
Daimler's supervisory board - had not signed the insider rules.
Insider Commission Powerless in Steinkuehler Case, REUTER FIN. REP., May 28, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, FINRPT File (emphasis added). For discussion of Franz
Steinkuehler see supra note 83.
97. Blum, supra note 21, at 520-21.
98. Id. at 523.
99. Germany has exchanges in Berlin, Bremen, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover,
Munich, and Stuttgart. Appel & Wegen, supra note 66, at 141.
100. POSER, supra note 22, at 314.
101. See generally DONALD S. DETWILER, GERMANY: A SHORT HISTORY (2d ed. 1989).
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ed to frustrate efforts to harness the economic and financial power of
Germany's disparate stock exchanges and has hindered efforts to con-
vert those exchanges into a centralized securities market. 2
Above all, the nonbinding status of the guidelines had been the
greatest obstacle to their enforcement. Only in those instances where
insiders had contractually undertaken obligations to their employers to
comply with the guidelines were they legally precluded from engaging
in insider trading. 3 Moreover, companies could choose not to adopt
insider-trading guidelines altogether." 4
B. The German Statute
The limited scope and stringency of the voluntary guidelines pro-
vided an insufficient framework for the drafting of any new German
legislation implementing Directive 89/592. However, the task confront-
ing Germany's legislators was not insuperable and opponents of inves-
tor-protection law reform in Germany were in the end defeated. The
Directive's main thrust in trying to counter insider trading is in the
wide-ranging, yet precise, definitions of critical terms in its investor-
protection mechanisms and their application to such a wide spectrum of
securities transactions.
The definition of "insider" in the statute contains both primary and
secondary insiders, including "tippees."'' 5 The statute definition of
"inside information" includes similar requirements to the three specif-
ics in the guidelines."°' However, the fourth specific in the guidelines
mandated by the Directive definition, requiring that the information be
precise, is not specifically included,0 7 and this may pose a problem.
The provisions for enforcement and penalties mandated by the
Directive are probably too flexible. They have allowed the German
legislature, as well as the legislatures of the other member states, too
much leeway -in designing a system for viable securities regulation.
Whereas the provisions defining the scope of the Directive and the
meaning of fundamental terms are reasonably precise and make manip-
102. Another Unification Problem, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 1991, at 61 (noting that smaller
exchanges in Germany view centralization of the German stock markets as a threat to their
existence and that local politicians view local exchanges as a symbol of success for their re-
gions).
103. Blum, supra note 21, at 517.
104. Id. at 519.
105. Nystrom, supra note 10, at 135.
106. The guideline definition is that the information: (i) be nonpublic, (ii) relates to the
securities being traded, and (iii) has potentially a material effect on the price of the securities.
See INSIDER TRADING GUIDELINES, supra note 65, § 2(3), at 109.
107. German Statute, supra note 71, § 13(1)3.
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ulation by member states more difficult, 08 the enforcement and pun-
ishment provisions essentially abdicate responsibility to mandate similar
specifics."° When the European Parliament first reviewed the pro-
posed Directive, it urged the adoption of harmonized penalties. Howev-
er, the Council failed to embrace and mandate more rigorous and
coercive enforcement requirements in addition to more harmonized
punitive measures for violations. I This failure has led to criticism of
the enforcement and penalty provisions in the Directive by a number of
commentators. " '
Furthermore, with regard to enforcement, the Directive has not
mandated a central, supranational securities regulation agency for the
EU. 2 Instead, it requires that each member state designate a compe-
tent authority, or set of authorities, to ensure compliance with the
mandatory insider-trading regulations." 3 Under the German statute,
enforcement of the new law through criminal proceedings is attained by
Federal Supervisory Authority notification to the competent state
prosecutor's office when information suggesting criminal violation of
the insider trading law comes to light."4 This structural arrangement
leaves the actual prosecution up to the state prosecutor's office and
allocates to the Federal Supervisory Authority essentially a monitoring
role." 5
In Germany, with its small, regional exchanges deeply rooted in a
long tradition of local autonomy, ' 16 the statute's assignment of en-
forcement responsibility to state prosecutor's offices is not certain to
attain significant enforcement. In fact, this state prosecution solution
was adopted apparently because, although an increasing number of
German securities traders had stopped criticizing national insider-trad-
ing laws,"' they did not prefer a central enforcement agency akin to
the United States' SEC and its extensive enforcement machinery." 's
108. Stutz, supra note 6, at 168.
109. Id. at 171-72.
110. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1047-49.
111. Id. at 1074; Ramsdell, supra note 87, at 674; Nystrom, supra note 10, at 139-40;
McGuinness, supra note 12, at 449; Appel & Wegen, supra note 66, at 140; Stutz, supra note
6, at 172.
112. Such an agency would be the functional equivalent to the SEC in the United States.
113. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, arts. 8, 13. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1075.
114. German Statute, supra note 71, § 18(1).
115. Id. § 18(2).
116. See supra text accompanying note 101.
117. See Insider Trading Becoming Less Acceptable in Europe, supra note 81.
118. The German Statute provides for the establishment of the German Federal Supervisory
Authority to supervise the securities markets. See German Statute, supra note 71, § 16(l). As
part of its supervisory functions, the Authority is empowered to demand production of informa-
tion and documents in order to detect irregularities. Id. § 16(2),(3). The Authority may also
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Therefore, the statute has struck a compromise, by splitting the func-
tions between a federal supervisory authority and the state prosecutor's
offices of the individual states on the following basis.
The German Statute provides for the establishment of the German
Federal Supervisory Authority (Authority) to supervise the securities
markets. 19 As part of its supervisory functions, the Authority is em-
powered to demand production of information and documents in order
to detect irregularities 2 ' and to determine whether or not violations
have occurred.'21 On suspicion, based upon the information collected
that violations have occurred, the Authority must notify the appropriate
state prosecutor's office so that criminal proceedings can be brought
against the perpetrators if appropriate.'22 The state prosecutor's offic-
es are required to keep the Authority informed of the progress of each
case. 123
Unfortunately, adoption of this compromise solution may very well
inevitably perpetuate the current fragmentation in German securities
regulation. Whereas the federal legislature has enacted statutory provi-
sions for implementing the Directive, local state prosecution agencies
have been allowed to retain important powers that inevitably allocate to
them significant discretion in determining the manner in which the new
laws will be enforced.
Of course, in the interest of promoting consistency, the Directive
requires that regulatory agencies in the member states cooperate with
each other in enforcing their insider-trading laws.'24 As a practical
matter, this has been accomplished in the German statute, for the most
part, by requiring the sharing of information procured in the course of
individual investigations.' 25 Hopefully, if German enforcement efforts
turn out to be less effective than those of other member states, such as
France or the United Kingdom, the example of more vigorous imple-
mentation by its counterparts may prod Germany into more energetic
action in this regard. Admittedly, however, the external stimulus of
other member states' practices may tend to play a more noticeable role
determine whether or not violations have occurred. Id. § 16(4). Based upon the information
collected, and on suspicion that violations have occurred, the Authority must notify the appro-
priate state prosecutor's office so that criminal proceedings can be brought against the perpetra-
tors. Id. § 18(1). The state prosecutor's offices are required to keep the Authority informed of
the progress of each case. Id. § 18(2).
119. See German Statute, supra note 71, § 16(1).
120. Id. § 16(2), (3).
121. Id. § 16(4).
122. Id. § 18(l).
123. Id. § 18(2).
124. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 10(I).
125. German Statute, supra note 71, § 19.
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in international rather than local investigations, since the EU has not
provided a centralized securities regulation enforcement agency. More-
over, other than the Frankfurt stock market, German exchanges are
relatively small. As a result, it is less likely that Germany's state en-
forcement agencies will have many opportunities to participate in inter-
national investigations requiring cooperation with more aggressive
member state counterparts.
With regard to retribution, the provisions of the Directive are
weaker and use less assertive language'26 than in the enforcement
provisions. 27 Member states are accorded substantial discretion in
their selection of penalties "sufficient . . . to promote compliance"
with the insider trading laws that they enact pursuant to the Directive's
mandate.'28 Although administrative authorities in each member state
must "ensure" that insider trading laws are properly applied, 29 the
penalties enacted need only "promote," rather than coerce, compli-
ance."0 By enacting a criminal framework, the German statute seems
to take enforcement seriously. Relegating enforcement to criminal pro-
ceedings by state prosecutor's offices - rather than creating a more
powerful federal supervisory authority akin to the U.S. SEC - has
seriously weakened prospective enforcement as a practical matter.
In criminalizing violations of the insider-trading law, the German
statute has attempted to stigmatize insider trading and hopefully, this
will help to reverse "decades of European regulatory indifference" to
these harmful practices.'' In a country where insider trading is
viewed "simply as a lucky tip,"'32 the Directive would be unlikely to
provide a sufficient impetus for weakening the temptation to engage in
insider trading or to reverse the firmly established attitudes of indiffer-
126. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 13.
127. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 8.
128. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 13 (emphasis added).
129. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 8.
130. Directive 89/592, supra note 23, art. 13 (emphasis added). Conceivably, the shortcom-
ings of the Directive in this regard are due, in large part, to the EC institutions' tradition of re-
fraining from specifying sanctions in any detailed way, leaving them to the discretion of the
member states. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1074 n.242 (arguing that this tradition must be
abandoned in order to achieve regulatory harmony).
131. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1074. The Directive does not mandate that member states
criminalize insider trading, but the United Kingdom has criminalized insider trading in imple-
menting the provisions of Directive 89/592 in the Criminal Justice Act 1993. See Balancing
Act, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 86. Presumably, the issuance by the Commission of an
Art. 169 letter, (see Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 169, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75) to the
United Kingdom in 1992, must have prodded the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. See
Tenth Annual Report on the Monitoring of the Application of Community Law: Report on the
Application of Directives, COM(93)320 final at 356.
132. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1041.
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ence toward such practice. 33
Germany, however, must be wary of its potential leadership role
in the EU, and in Europe generally. "Germany's central position, the
result of geography and politics, culture and economics . . . with all
the advantages and drawbacks which history has proven are so hard [to
bring] into balance[,]J ' 34 cannot be ignored. One commentator has
expressed the belief that, although Germany has statutorily prohibited
insider trading out of a sense of obligation mandated by the Directive,
and perhaps even out of fear of losing investor confidence, the new
regulations are probably not the result of a fundamental change of heart
by the regulated, the regulators, and the courts.' 35 If accurate, this
would be a profound tragedy. Germany owes it not only to the EU, but
also to itself, to adopt a more enlightened posture towards this perni-
cious activity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, Council Directive 89/592 on Insider Trading has
introduced and harmonized sophisticated insider-trading laws through-
out the EU. Some specific provisions, as highlighted, create uncertain-
ties with regard to prohibiting countries, such as Germany, from con-
tinuing a course of conduct substantially similar to past practices of
widespread indifference toward insider trading. In a nation where the
financial sector is large and powerful, as it is in Germany, if insider
trading continues to be perceived as simply immoral conduct in spite of
the German statute's criminalization of the activity, the EU governing
institutions will most likely expect from German state enforcement
agencies less than vigorous pursuit of cases referred to them by the
Federal Supervisory Authority.
The Directive's approach to enforcement and penalties of relegat-
ing coercion to the member states individually, may ultimately fail to
provide the hoped for deterrence. Nonetheless, Germany may do well
to heed the sentiments expressed by German President Richard von
Weizsacker:
To put it in [the] form of a parable: [Germany is] like [someone] in the
middle of a boat surrounded by . . .friends sitting at the edge. He is the one
who has to keep the boat evenly balanced. His weight and position give him
influence and demand attention even when he does not particularly want it.
They place on him a special burden of responsibility, restriction and even
discrimination: he cannot jump up and down, swap seats with his neighbor
133. Id. at 1041.
134. See German President, supra note 59, at 3.
135. Warren, supra note 3, at 1041. See also Daft Draft, supra note 79, at 87 (suggesting
that judges will continue to treat insider trading as a "gentlemanly misunderstanding rather than
a crime").
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or even shift his weight lest he rock the boat and put everyone in danger.
His movements have to be coordinated well in advance and carefully dis-
cussed with several if not all of his neighbors."
Germany must energetically cooperate with the other EU member
states to maintain honest, efficient, and policed securities markets that
inspire investor confidence and promote the healthy, unrestricted flow
of capital into German companies and its economy. Such action will
reap permanent, rather than transient, benefits for Germany, as well as
for all the other member states of the EU.
136. See German President, supra note 59, at 3.
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